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Abstract
Machine learning techniques are currently used extensively for automating various cybersecurity tasks.
Most of these techniques utilize supervised learning algorithms that rely on training the algorithm to classify
incoming data into different categories, using data encountered in the relevant domain. A critical vulnerabil-
ity of these algorithms is that they are susceptible to adversarial attacks where a malicious entity called an
adversary deliberately alters the training data to misguide the learning algorithm into making classification
errors. Adversarial attacks could render the learning algorithm unsuitable to use and leave critical systems
vulnerable to cybersecurity attacks. Our paper provides a detailed survey of the state-of-the-art techniques
that are used to make a machine learning algorithm robust against adversarial attacks using the compu-
tational framework of game theory. We also discuss open problems and challenges and possible directions
for further research that would make deep machine learning-based systems more robust and reliable for
cybersecurity tasks.
Keywords: Machine learning, adversarial learning, game theory.
1 Introduction
Adversarial learning [55] is an instance of machine learning where two entities called the learner and adversary
attempt to learn a prediction mechanism for data related to a problem domain at hand, albeit with different
objectives. The learner’s objective in learning the prediction mechanism is to correctly predict or classify
the data. In contrast, the adversary’s objective is to imperceptibly coerce the learner into making incorrect
predictions for the data in the future. A very popular instance of adversarial learning is email spam filtering [55,
26]. Here, the learner is the spam filter with a prediction mechanism that classifies incoming email into two
categories, spam or non-spam. On the other hand, the adversary is the spammer who in addition to generating
spam email, also tries to add, remove or alter certain words or characters in the email text [11] so that it
can disguise non-spam email as spam, and vice-versa. If the spammer is succcessful, the spam filter ends
up mis-classifying the altered non-spam emails as spam (false positives) or the altered spam emails as non-
spam (false negatives). Both these mis-classifications could be dangerous for the integrity of the email filtering
system, not only do they block legitimate email and allow potentially malicious spam email to pass through, but
they also reduce the confidence in the email classification performed by the spam filter. Adversarial learning
poses a severe cybersecurity threat in several domains that employ machine learning-based classifier systems
including automated email spam filters and anti-virus software, image classification algorithms in defense and
medical applications, and text-based sentiment analysis algorithms used on social media data. To combat these
challenges, researchers have proposed several techniques that aim to make the learner’s classifier robust against
adversarial attacks [26]. Many of these techniques employ a popular framework of decision making at the
intersection of mathematics, economics and computer science called game theory [16, 38, 49]. Game theory
provides an attractive tool for adversarial learning as it provides a means to mathematically model the learner
and adversary’s behaviors in terms of defense and attack strategies and determine suitable strategies to reduce
the learner’s loss from adversarial attacks. In this survey, we focus on such game theory-based techniques that
have been used to make machine learning algorithms robust against adversarial attacks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section we provide background information on
adversarial learning and game theory. Following that, we summarize the contributions of game theory-based
adversarial learning approaches and solution techniques. Then, we discuss open issues and challenges for future
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of different types of adversarial attacks along three dimensions proposed in [26]. Influence and
security violation-based attacks are divided into distinct categories marked by solid and dashed dividing lines. Specificity
attacks range over a continuous spectrum marked as dotted arrows.
research directions in game theory-based modeling of adversarial learning, and, finally we conclude. Also, in the
rest of the paper, in accordance with machine learning literature, we assume that the output of the learner’s
prediction mechanism classifies the data into a finite set of classes, each class is identified with an output label.
Finally, for legibility, while following most of the existing literature in this area, we assume that the learner uses
a classifier for its prediction mechanism. In general, the learner could use any other prediction mechanism like
clustering, ranking or regression.
2 Background: Adversarial Learning and Games
Adversarial Learning. Adversarial learning deals with techniques used by a machine learning-based prediction
mechanism such as a classifier to make itself robust against adversarial attacks. In [26], authors provide a
comprehensive overview of adversarial learning techniques. Their work includes a taxonomy for adversarial
learning while characterizing it along three dimensions - influence, specificity and security violation, as shown
in Fig. 1. Influence is the most relevant and widely researched dimension for adversarial learning because it
characterizes the adversary based on its behavior, with the objective of developing appropriate learner strategies
to counter the adversary’s behavior. The influence dimension specifies two types of adversarial attacks called
causative and exploratory (a.k.a. probing) that are illustrated in Fig. 2. In causative attacks the adversary
acquires data that was used to train the learner’s classifier and modifies this data. This modified data, called
adversarial data, is then used by the learner during further training of its classifier. This results in the learner
learning an incorrect classifier that gives classification errors (false positives and false negatives) while testing or
while using the classifier. In exploratory attacks, the adversary observes the output of the learner’s classifier for
different data and tries to discover its vulnerabilities (e.g., what data it mis-classifies). It then creates adversarial
data that exploits those vulnerabilities to increase the classifier’s mis-classification rate during test or application
time. Two other dimensions of adversarial learning shown in Fig. 1 are security violation and specificity. The
reader is referred to [26], for approaches that counter adversarial attacks along these three dimensions. The
rest of this paper focuses specifically on how the influence dimension’s causative and exploratory attacks are
countered with game theory-based techniques.
Non-cooperative Game. Adversarial learning has been extensively modeled as a 2-player, non-cooperative
game. A non-cooperative game can be informally defined as an interaction between two or more players over
a resource that has to be shared between the players. The game, represented in normal form, is given by
(N,A,U), where N is the set of players, A = {Ai} where Ai is the set of actions for player i, and, U = {Ui},
were Ui(ai, a−i) gives a real-valued number called utility received by each player i ∈ N when it selects action
ai ∈ Ai while other players jointly select a−i ∈ A−i, A−i = ×Aj 6=i. The utility of each player gives its preference
over the different outcomes of the game resulting from different joint actions by the players. Player i’s strategy
set Si = {π(Ai) : π(Ai) ≥ 0 ∀i,
∑
Ai
π(Ai) = 1} specifies a probability distribution over its actions Ai. The
outcome of a game is a strategy selected by each player. One of the most widely used techniques to calculate a
player’s strategy in a game is given by Nash equilibrium (NE). NE assumes that players behave rationally and
each player i plays its best response strategy given by si that satisfies Ui(si, s−i) ≥ Ui(s
′
i, s−i), ∀i ∈ N . The NE
of a 2-player game can be represented as a linear complimentarity problem and solved using linear programming
or as a search problem [49]. Below, we briefly mention a few aspects of games that are relevant to adversarial
learning. Because adversarial learning is a 2-player game between the learner and the adversary, we denote the
two players using subscripts l and a respectively.
Zero-sum vs. Non-zero Sum Game. In a 2-player, zero-sum game, the utilities of players, the learner and
adversary, sum to zero. In other words, the gain in utility of the learner comes at the cost of loss of adversary’s
utilities and vice-versa. In a 2-player, zero-sum game, the NE can be calulated using the minimax theorem,
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Figure 2: Adversarial learning scenario showing the two types of influence-based adversarial attacks - causative (top
right) and exploratory (bottom right). The learner uses a support vector machine to classify input. Red color input
represents adversarial examples that are created by the adversary using a perturbation function φ() from valid examples
from the training set and re-injected into the training set.
which says that the game’s Nash equilibrium outcome is the same as its minimax outcome. The minmax outcome
can be represented as constrained optimization problem and solved as a linear program. Adversarial learning
has been extensively modeled as a 2-player, zero sum game. However, recently Bruckner et al. [6] observe that
assuming adversarial learning is a zero-sum game is overly pessimistic - the utility loss of the learner might not
equal the utility gain of the adversary. Consequently, they model adversarial learning as a non-zero sum or
general sum game. Unfortunately, minmax theorem’s result does not hold for general sum games, and, more
complicated, general Nash equilibrium solution techniques [49] have to be used to determine the learner and
adversary’s selected strategies.
Simultaneous Move vs. Sequential Game. In a simultaneous move game, players make their strategy selection
simultaneously and cannot observe each others’ strategy before selecting their own. In contrast, in a sequential
move game, players take turns in selecting their strategies (or, making their moves). Adversarial learning has
been modeled as the latter - the learner is the player making the first move or the leader, because it usually
publishes its classifier and is not aware of the presence of the adversary [26, 21]. The adversary, on the other
hand, is the follower because it can observe the learner’s classifier and then make its move of selecting a suitable
strategy to generate adversarial instances. Sequential move games are easier to solve than simultaneous move
games because the follower knows the leader’s selected strategy and can use this information to select its utility-
maximizing strategy. The leader’s strategy selection technique, however, does not have information about
the follower’s selected strategy. Consequently, while selecting its strategy, the leader has to incorporate this
uncertainty about the follower’s strategy using a type of game called a Bayesian game, as described next.
Bayesian Game. The normal form game mentioned above assumes that each player has information about
the utilities of other players, for each action. This assumption might not be valid in many practical, real-life
scenarios because it is unrealistic for a player to have accurate information about competing player’s utilities.
For example, in adversarial learning, the learner might not have accurate information of the adversary’s cost
to generate adversarial data [6, 21] or the adversary might not have accurate information about the learner’s
classification cost [35]. The problem is addressed through a Bayesian game [24], where each player is assumed
to have a set of types. The utility that a player gets from each of its actions now also depends on its types. A
player does not know the exact type of other players, but it knows the probability distribution over the types.
Based on this information, a player can calculate expected utilities, conditioned on the other players’ types.
Some researchers have modeled adversarial learning as a Bayesian sequential-move game, where the learner
assumes a set of types for the adversary along with probability distribution over the types. It then selects a
strategy based on its expected utilities conditioned on the prior probabilities of the different adversary types,
as discussed in the section on non-zero sum games, later on in our article.
It is worth mentioning that the topic of security games is closely related to adversarial learning, althought
the roles and objectives of the learner and adversary in a security game are slightly different from those in
adversarial learning. In security games [43], the learner is called the defender, whose objective is to protect
a set of targets from an adversary, referred to as an attacker. The problem facing the defender is to allocate
protection resources within budget and operational constraints, to achieve a desired level of security. Security
games have been applied to different real-life applications including airport security [44], wildlife protection [14]
and natural resource conservation [15]. An excellent discussion on security games is available in [51].
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References Initial Information about learner Adversary Attack Model Validation domain
with adversary
Zero Sum Games
[11] Full information about learner’s Causative attacks Spam filtering
utility, cost and classifier parameters
[35, 39, 31, 57] No information about learner’s Exploratory attacks by changing Spam filtering
utility, costs and classifier parameters values of future input
[17, 12, 52] No information about learner’s Exploratory attacks by removing Spam filtering
utility, costs and classifier parameters features from future input
[23] With and without info. about prob. Exploratory attacks by changing Spam filtering
distribution of input and ground truth values of future input
[18] Full information about learner’s Exploratory attacks counterfeiting Image classification
utility, cost and classifier params valid input
Sequential, Bayesian, Non-zero Sum Games
[6, 21, 5] No information about learner’s Exploratory attacks by changing Spam filtering
[22, 36, 7] utility, costs and classifier parameters values of future input
[1] No information about learner’s Exploratory attacks on test Stock prices
utility, costs and classifier parameters set only
[62, 60, 13] No information about learner’s Exploratory attacks by mixing valid Spam filtering
utility, costs and classifier parameters and adversarial input, e.g., altering [62, 60]
all or part of input features
Table 1: Comparison of game theory-based adversarial learning techniques.
3 Game Theory based Adversarial Learning Techniques
Adversarial learning is usually modeled as a 2-player game between the learner and adversary. The learner’s set
of actions corresponds to selecting different hyper-parameters for its classifer, while the adversary’s set of actions
correspond to different strategies for changing valid data into adversarial data. For example, the adversary’s
actions could be to add different amounts of perturbation or noise to valid data, or, to remove certain features
from valid data. The utilities for the learner and the adversary are defined in terms of their joint actions.
In one of the earliest and seminal works on adversarial classification Dalvi et al. [11] formulated adversarial
classification as a 2-player competitive game between the learner and the adversary called a classification
game. The learner’s prediction mechanism is a binary classifier while the adversary creates adversarial input by
perturbing features from legitimate input. The game is asymmetric as the adversary is aware of the learner’s
classifier parameters, utilities and costs, but the learner is not aware whether an input is adversarial versus
legitimate. Within this setting, the learner’s utility is defined as its value from classifying input (misclassification
yields negative value), minus a per-feature cost for including input features in the classification algorithm.
Similarly, the adversary’s utility is defined as its value from misclassification of an adversarial input by the
learner (correct classification by learner yields negative value to adversary), minus its cost to generate the
adversarial input from legitimate input. Both learner and adversary play a Nash equilibrium strategy. The
problem is formulated as a constrained optimization problem and solved as a mixed integer linear program
for the adversary that is then used by the learner to determine a robust classification strategy. The proposed
strategy is validated using spam email data sets with different adversarial perturbation strategies and different
learner misclassification penalties and shown to yield positive classifier utilties, implying low misclassfication
rates of adversarial input by the learner.
Following [11], researchers have proposed different approaches to define these utilities depending on their
learner and adversary behavior models. We categorize the solution techniques proposed in literature into two
categories - those that use zero-sum games to model the interaction between the learner and adversary followed
by a minimax-based, linear optimization solution to solve it, and, those that model the interaction as a non-zero
sum game and use a Nash equilibrium-based, bi-level optimization, or related solution. Table 1 gives a list of
the major game theory-based approaches for adversarial learning along different learner and adversary models
and solution techniques.
3.1 Zero Sum Games: Constrained Optimization-based Solution Techniques
Lowd and Meek [35], extended Dalvi et al.’s model while relaxing the assumption that the adversary has full
information about the learner’s classification algorithm, utilities and costs. Although their main algorithm called
Adversarial Classifier Reverse Engineering (ACRE) is not based on a game, we review it here as it has formed
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the basis for future game theory-based techniques for adversarial learning. In the adversarial learning problem
considered by [35], the adversary can discover information about the learner’s classifier by sending a limited
number of queries containing adversarial input. With this limited knowledge of the learner’s classifier, the
adversary’s objective is to determine the input instance that incurs the lowest cost to modify into an adversarial
input. The set of such input instances are called attack vectors. Using the ACRE algorithm, the adversary
can find attack vectors that can defeat the learner’s classification algorithm when the input consists of either
continuous or binary features. The algorithm is validated on spam email data sets when the learner uses either a
Naive Bayes or a maximum entropy based classifier and shows that an adversary using ACRE can find instances
within 17% of the actual lowest cost instance while using a few thousand queries. In [39], authors generalized
ACRE to an ǫ-instance minimal adversarial cost problem, where the learner’s set of classifiers is expanded from
linear classifier to more general, convex-inducing classifiers. Their solution searches over the adversarial cost
space to determine the minimum set of adversarial examples, called the evasion set, that needs to be generated
by the adversary to effect classification errors by the learner. Unlike [35], avoiding the reverse engineering of
the classifier allows their approach to handle classifiers that are difficult to reverse engineer. Recently, Li and
Vorobeychik [31] [57] also extended the ACRE framework. Their proposed techniques include defining the
cost between instances using equivalence class-based cost functions and solving the optimization problem facing
the adversary as a mixed integer linear program, and, using a concept called moving target defense [27] where
the learner employs randomization over multiple classifiers instead of tuning parameters of a single classifier to
make its prediction robust against adversarial attacks.
Another parallel, but related line of research, considers the adversary’s behavior from a slightly different
approach, where the adversary generates adversarial data by selecting, removing or corrupting features from
the input data set. Globerson et al. [17] describe such a setting where the adversary can remove multiple
or single features from input and the learner’s objective is to determine an optimal set of feature weights
for its classifier, that minmize a metric called the hinge loss. The problem is formulated as a minimax, zero
sum game and represented as a constrained optimization problem. The proposed algorithm was verified with
adversarial data and shown to give lower error rates than a support vector machine classifier for handwritten
digit classification and spam filtering. Globerson’s model of selective feature removal by the adversary was
extended in [12] with two variants of the learner. When the learner is able to train a classifier using training
data, the problem is solved as a linear program. On the other hand, when the learner does not have access
to training data, the learning task becomes an online learning problem. In this case, the learner’s classifier
is determined using a neural network, perceptron algorithm [46] followed by a batching technique to model
the online classifier as a statistical learning algorithm while making statistical guarantees about the classifier’s
performance. Experiments comparing the authors’ algorithm with those in [17, 52] while using the same data
sets, show that their proposed technique improves classification accuracy over the compared techniques.
In [23], the authors consider adversarial learning games from the perspective of information revelation by
the learner and adversary. They consider two variants of the learner: (i) when the learner has information
about adversary’s cost function, ground truth and input distribution, and (ii) when the learner knows only
adversary’s cost function, but not ground truth or input distribution. Similarly, two types of adversary are
considered: one that knows all parameters that the learner knows plus its own adversarial example generation
function, and, another, that knows only its own cost function and adversarial example generation function.
Within these settings, the learner’s objective is to determine a strategy robust algorithm - one that selects a
classifier that maximizes the probability of the classifier’s output corresponding to the ground truth for possibly
adversarial examples. On the other hand, the adversary tries to create adversarial examples that maximize its
utility given by the difference between its benefit from the learner’s classifier output for that example and its
cost to generate the example. Their results theoretically analyze the running time and sample complexity of
the learner for different types of adversary functions called separable and non-separable.
As mentioned earlier, most existing literature on adversarial learning games assume a sequential-move game
with the learner as the leader. However, few researchers have analyzed adversarial learning where the learner
knows the adversary’s strategy to generate adversarial data, but the adversary does not have information
about the learner’s classifier. This makes the adversary the leader and the learner the follower [28, 32]. Liu
and Chawla [32] consider such a setting where the adversary tries to generate adversarial data that results in
moving the learner’s classification boundary between spam versus non-spam email. The learner uses a genetic
algorithm to search classifier parameters that reduce its classification error in response to these adversarial
attacks. This work was extended by the authors to calculate the Nash equilibrium of a constant-sum game
efficiently with reduced computation [33], and, recently, with the learner using a deep convolutional neural
network as its classifier [10]. Nevertheless, several authors [26, 6] justify the learner as the leader while observing
that most real-life classifier-based systems like email spam filters and network traffic filters publish their classifier
algorithms publicly.
In contrast to sequential move games, simultaneous move games have been used less often to model interaction
between an adversary and the learner. Recently, Schuurmans and Zinkevich [47] have addressed the problem
of training a deep neural network as solving for a Nash equilibrium in a repeated, zero-sum game between two
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players, called protagonist and antagonist. The antagonist’s objective is to determine a set of parameters that
reduces the loss function during training, while the protagonist tries to select weight values of the edges in the
deep network such that its utility is the negative of the antagonist’s utility. Additional players called zannis are
placed at the input and hidden layer nodes to select those nodes’ parameter values. Iterations used to adjust
weights of the neural network’s edges in a conventional supervised training algorithm are modeled as repeated
plays of the game aimed at converging to the Nash equilibrium and implemented using two algorithms called
exponentiated weight and regret matching. Although not directly related to an adversarial setting where the
adversary generates adversarial data to misguide the learner’s classification, the deep learning game provides
an interesting direction that is amenable to be extended to an adversarial setting.
3.2 Non-zero Sum Games: Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Related Solution Tech-
niques
Non-zero sum games have been proposed as a more realistic model for the interactions between the learner and
adversary in adversarial learning [6, 21, 22, 36, 1] because the loss in utility of learner might not exactly equal
to the gain in utility of the adversary, and vice-versa. In a non-zero sum adversarial learning game, the learner
calculates its loss in utility as proportional to the number of data instances on which it made a classification
error because the data was modified by the adversary. However, a wrinkle to this approach is that the learner
does not know whether the adversary had indeed modified the data to make it commit a classification mistake.
For example, consider a learner in an automated email spam filter that has a spam identification rule as: ’if
there are more than three misspelled words in an email text, then the email is spam’. Suppose that this learner
receives an email that has five misspelled words and classifies it as spam following its spam identification rule.
However, the learner does not know if the misspelled words were generated by an adversary, or, whether, they
were genuine typographic errors made by a human. To address this problem, the learner tries to estimate
probabilistically, if an instance it classifies was generated by an adversary or not, and, weighs its classification
error by this probability. Correspondingly, the adversary also calculates its loss in utility depending on whether
its adversarially generated instance was able to fool the classifier or not. Using this framework, Bruckner et
al. [6] proposed a non-zero sum game to model adversarial learning. The pairs of utilties of the learner and the
adversary form a probabilistic version of the normal form game called a Bayesian game. The strategies adopted
by the players in this Bayesian game, for example, the classifier hyperparameters selected by the learner and the
perturbation strategy to modify legitimate data selected by the adversary, is calculated using the Bayes-Nash
equilibrium.
Like the ACRE algorithm [35], Bruckner’s model [6] has also been extended from different aspects in future
research. In [36], authors considered attacks on the training set in adversarial learning within a problem called
machine teaching. Here, the adversary takes the role of a teacher while the learner takes on the role of a student
whose objective is to learn a concept from data provided by the teacher. The objective of the teacher is to make
causative attacks discussed in the background section of our article, so that it can coerce the learner towards
learning a concept that it desires. Like [6], the problem is modeled as a bi-level optimization problem and
solved by relaxing it to linear optimization using Karush-Kuhn Tucker(KKT) conditions. Subsequently, Alfeld
et al. [1] extended this framework to test time attacks on data. Bruckner’s model [6] has also been generalized
in [7] using randomized prediction games where the learner’s prediction algorithm randomizes over classifiers
with different weight parameters while the adversary randomizes over its adversarial vectors.
Another direction of adversarial learning investigated by Zhou et al. [62] is along the lines of Globerson’s
model of selective feature removal [17]. Here, the authors consider two adversarial attack models called full
range attacks and restrained attacks. In a full range attack, the adversary can perturb any fraction of the
maximum range of a feature. On the other hand, in a restrained range attack, the adversary can perturb only a
fraction of the difference between its intended value and the actual value of a feature. The learner’s prediction
mechanism to counter these attacks is an SVM-based classifier that minimizes hinge loss. Extending this work
towards more robust learner, the authors proposed a mixture of Bayesian experts approach [60] as the learner’s
prediction mechanism.
An adversarial learning game called a classification game in [13] considers a practical adversarial strategy used
by adversaries like spammers. Spammers might sometimes behave non-maliciously and not generate adversarial
data to misguide the learner. This could result in false alarms by the learner if it incorrectly identifies the
adversary as malicious when it is not. To account for this, the learner maintains a probability of the adversary
being malicious versus non-malicious. The game is non-zero sum as the learner’s utility includes the negative
of the adversary’s utility when it is a malicious, plus the learner’s expected penalty from false alarms. Their
work analyses the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for this classification game and proposes a
constrained optimization solution, solved as linear program, to calculate the Nash equilibrium. Their model
is validated by generating numeric values of learner and adversary costs, and size of strategy sets when data
instances have either single or multiple features. Their results show that the learner utility decreases while
attacker utility increases when either the cost of a single attack or the false alarm penalty increases.
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4 Learner Robustness via Adversarial Data Modeling
The game theory-based adversarial learning techniques discussed thus far mainly focus on strategies that the
learner could use to develop robustness against attacks from an adversary. Another approach to build the
learner’s defense mechanism, although not based on game theory, focusses on modeling the malicious data
generated by the adversary so that the learner could understand the nature of adversarial attacks. Armed with
information about the characteristics of adversarial attacks, the learner could then build appropriate defenses,
such as train its classifier with the adversarial data, to improve robustness against the adversarial attacks. In
this section, we provide an overview of three popular techniques for adversarial data generation that could
be used in conjunction with adversarial learning. These techniques include adversarial data generation using
perturbation techniques on valid examples, transferring adversarial examples across different learner models,
and generative adversarial networks.
4.1 Adversarial Data Generation via Perturbation
Before building the learner’s defense mechanism against adversarial attacks, a first line of defense towards
protecting against attacks is to understand how the adversary crafts those attacks. The topic of adversarial data
generation seeks to address this issue by developing and analyzing different techniques that create synthetic,
adversarial data, which could be used by potential adversaries. In most of these techniques, an adversarial
example is constructed by adding a certain amount of noise or perturbation to a valid example. The main
objective while creating an adversarial example is to perturb a valid example so that the perturbation is
imperceptible to a human; in other words, the perturbed example appears to have the same label as a valid
example to a human. However, when presented to a machine classifier, the same perturbed example would
be assigned a different label than the valid example’s label. For example, in a spam filtering scenario, when a
perturbed example is created from a valid spam email message, the perturbed example would still appear to
be a spam message to a human, but a spam filtering classifier would categorize it as non-spam, and, vice-versa.
To achieve this property of imperceptibility to humans but deception for machine classifiers, the perturbation
added to a valid example should take the perturbed example just across a decision boundary of the machine’s
classifier. Too little of a perturbation prevents the perturbed example from crossing the decision boundary -
the perturbed example appears valid to the human, but does not fool the classifier either. On the other hand,
too much perturbation takes the perturbed example far across the decision boundary, the classifier does not
classify it correctly, but the excessively perturbed example appears as nonsense or rubbish [19] to a human who
can easily discern it as an adversarially perturbed example. The main problem in adversarial data generation
is then to determine this suitable amount of perturbation.
In one of the earliest works in this direction, Biggio et al. [4] proposed a gradient descent technique that
used the gradient of the discriminant function of the classifier along with the density function of the data to
calculate a suitable amount of perturbation and generate a perturbed example. The proposed technique was
validated to generate adversarial data from valid examples of handwritten digits and portable document format
(PDF) text files while using different machine learning classifiers including linear classifiers, support vector
machines and neural network classifiers. Optimization-based algorithms to determine the minimum amount of
perturbation have been proposed in [50], [8]. Goodfellow et al. in [19] made several fundamental contributions
towards understanding properties of perturbations that create adversarial examples as well as properties of
learner models that make them susceptible to adversarial examples. They proposed a fast, simple yet effective
perturbation technique called Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to add perturbation proportional to the
gradient of the cost function (e.g., loss function) to classify an example in a deep neural network. Their work
also made valuable observations about perturbation techniques such as the direction of perturbation rather than
amount of perturbation is more critical in creating adversarial examples, training a classifier with adversarial
examples is akin to regularization of the classifier, and that a positive correlation exists between the degree to
which a learning model can be optimized and its susceptibility to perturbation. Building upon these directions,
researchers have proposed more refined perturbation techniques such as perturbing the label that has the lowest
probability for the valid example in a single or multiple steps [29] [30], perturbing an example’s features that
are most likely to change the classifier’s output based on forward gradients [41], universal peturbations to
determine the minimal perturbation that will generate a certain fraction of adversarial examples guaranteed to
result in misclassification when the examples are drawn from a given data distribution [37] and neural networks
called adversarial transformation networks that are trained to create adversarial examples [3]. Most of the
aforementioned techniques have been proposed for generating adversarial data of handwritten digits or images.
In contrast, Sethi and Kantardzic described methods to generate adversarial text data. Adversarial examples
called attack data are constructed from probing the classifier with randomly perturbed text and retaining the
perturbations that are successful in fooling the classifier, when the number of probes that the adversary can
make is limited. Without limits on the number of probes, the adversary can reverse engineer [35] the classifier
to create more precise advesarial examples that are able to fool the classifier more often [48]. In [9], authors
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have recently proposed methods for generating adversarial audio data for misleading speech-to-text machine
classifiers. In general, the topic of adversarial data generation techniques to gain better insights into how the
adversary can deceive the learner’s classifier with malicious data is still an open research problem that requires
meticulous analysis of data perturbation techniques in conjunction with the characteristics of the model used
by the learner for classification.
4.2 Transferring Adversarial Examples
The adversarial data generation techniques discussed in the previous section require the virtual adversary to
utilize the model used by the learner to classify examples so that the virtual adversary can determine whether
the adversarial examples it generates are able to deceive the learner’s classifier. Because the virtual adversary
cannot gain access to the learner’s model, the adversary usually resorts to reconstructing the learner’s model via
probing - sending valid and adversarial examples to the learner’s model of the classifier and observing the output
label assigned by the classifier. Each probe incurs a cost for the adversary because the adversary has to expend
resources to acquire valid examples and perturb them, plus the learner could limit the number of examples the
adversary could send. To reduce costs, it would be beneficial for the adversary if it could generate adversarial
examples to fool a classifier while utilizing a certain learner model, and then reuse those same adversarial
examples to fool multiple, different classifiers. This technique of sending adversarial example generated using
one learner model to a different model for classification is called transferring examples. The transfer problem is
very relevant in the context of cybersecurity because it affords adversaries a low-cost technique to attack diverse
machine learning-based classifiers such as email spam filters, network intrusion detection systems, identity
authentication systems, etc., presumably at different locations while generating only one set of adversarial data.
As in the case of adversarial data generation, research in transferring adversarial examples has focused
mainly on what characteristics of learner models of classifiers favor transferring adversarial examples across
the models. In [19], authors identified that when the weight vectors of two neural network-based learning
models are aligned with each other, adversarial examples generated using one model could be transferred to
the other. The transferability of adversarially generated image data across different learning-based models of
image classifiers was investigated in [34] to discover that the alignment of the decision boundaries of different
models favors transferability of adversarial examples across models. Recently, Tramer et al. [54] investigated
the dimensionality of adversarial subspaces as a means to determine the transferability of adversarial examples.
They concluded that the subspace of adversarial examples has a large dimension (about 25) and adversarial
examples are transferable across two learner models when there is significant overlap in the subspace of the
adversarial examples generated using the two models. Based on these findings the same authors proposed a
technique called ensemble adversarial training [53] where perturbations generated using one learner model are
transferred or informed to another learner model to make the latter model more robust to adversarial examples.
Like adversarial data generation, transferability of adversarial examples between different learner models is also
an open problem whose investigation could lead to more robust adversarial learning techniques.
4.3 Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [18] have recently been proposed as a game theory-based techniques
to simultaneously generate perturbed examples from an adversary and then use those adversarial examples to
train the learner’s model. In a GAN, the learner uses a function called the discriminator (usually a classifier)
while the adversary’s function is called the generator. The interaction between the discriminator and the
generator is modeled as a zero-sum game, and both the discriminator and generator iteratively solve a minimax
optimization function. The optimization is done iteratively over chunks or batches of data and implements a
gradient descent over the respective loss functions of the discriminator and generator. Experimental results of
this approach show that both discriminator and generator are able to continuously adapt their prediction and
data corruption mechanisms respectively. Rather than improving the robustness of the learner to adversarial
examples, the main contribution of GANs has been to demonstrate that the adversary (generator) can create
very convincing adversarial or counterfeit examples, e.g., images of animals, human faces, traffic signs, etc.
that are not distinguishable from a real image by the human eye, but can cause the discriminator to output
an incorrect classification. For example, a picture of a cat could be modified by the generator in a way that
is imperceptible to the human eye but causes the discriminator to mis-label it as an airplane. More generally,
the GAN techniques have shown for the first time that data labeling, which is largely a supervised learning
task utilizing labeled training data from humans, can also be implemented as an unsupervised learning task by
exploiting the adversarial attacks of the generator. GANs have been used in several applications including image,
audio and video generation, computer vision tasks such as image and video labeling [56, 45]. Improvements
of the basic GAN including Wasserstein GAN [2], SeqGAN [58], StackGAN [59], and EnergyGAN [61] have
also been proposed. Defense mechanisms of the discriminator in a GAN include adversarial training, defensive
distillation and gradient masking [40], as well as statistical data analysis methods [20], although many of these
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techniques have been shown to be vulnerable more recently [8], [25]. Similar to perturbation-based adversarial
data generation, techniques developed for GANs to generate adversarial examples could also be used towards
developing stronger adversarial learning mechanisms.
5 Open Problems and Further Directions
As discussed above, game theory offers a convenient means of modeling learner and adversary behaviors in
adversarial learning. However, with recent developments in game theory based behavior modeling using re-
peated, evolutionary games and machine learning using deep networks, there are certain directions in which
these models could be improved to make adversarial learning more robust against real-life adversarial threats.
We identify some of these potential directions for future research below:
Richer models of learner and adversary behavior. A shortcoming of many existing game theory based
models of adversarial learning is that the learner uses only one-time interaction history with the adversary to
build and update its model of the adversarys behavior of generating adversarial data instances. We envisage that
a more complex model, that considers the history of interactions between the learner and adversary can enable
the learner to make more accurate decisions of the adversary’s behavior and adapt its classifier accordingly.
Repeated games with Bayesian learning provide a theoretical foundation for building such a history-based
model of the adversary by the learner. Investigating this direction, while developing fast, heuristics-based
algorithms that can guarantee accurate prediction of the adversarys behavior within quantifiable bounds, would
lead towards more accurate and robust models adversarial learning. Below, we identify some specific directions
and open problems in adversarial learning.
Bounded life-force of adversary and learner. Most of the game theory-based adversarial learning models
discussed above assume that the adversary has unlimited resources (e.g., access to valid data, Internet access),
and, budget to craft adversarial examples. Taken together, these assets could be considered as a life force of the
adversary. However, in real-life, Internet adversaries such as spammers, usually have limited life force within
which they attempt to maximize the impact of the adversarial data they generate. Recently, researchers have
started exploring this direction by considering a bounded feature adversary [42] that is limited in the extent of
change it can effect on features in valid data and on the number of queries it can make to the learner [17, 23]. An
interesting and practical future direction that has been less investigated is the effect diminishing life force on the
strategy of the adversary. For example, an adversary that perceives very little remaining life force would adopt
aggressive strategies to maximize its harm on the learner. Going a level deeper, the learner could also build a
model of the adversary’s life force by analyzing the adversary’s attacks and strategize its defense mechanism to
minimize harm. Repeated game frameworks with that incorporate life force-based strategizing offer an suitable
direction to investigate this problem.
Diminishing value of shared resources (data set). Yet another limitation of existing adversarial learning
models is that the value of shared resource, e.g., email data, is considered to be immutable while being subject
to adversarial attacks. In reality, due to non-zero error rates of the learner’s classifer, a small, but non-negligible
amount of causative and exploratory attacks get past the classifier, giving rise to a compromised data set and
reduce reliability of the classifier. It would make sense to investigate techniques that incorporate diminished
value of data in training and test, and its effect on the classifier confidence, in the defense mechanism used by
the learner. Once again, the adversary could simultaneously attempt to model the value of the data and the
classifier confidence, and incorporate these metrics into the adversarial data generation strategy.
Tactical defender and attacker strategies. As discussed earlier, game theory based adversarial learning
models use learner and adversary utility values to parameterize strategies. In real-life, adversaries like spammers
of Website attackers use tactical strategies for their attacks. Example learner strategies could include guns or
butter, growing soft, strict justice, layered defense, while the attacker could strategize with low but slow attacks,
surprise attack, David and Goliath-type attack, suicide attack. Techniques from behavioral game theory provide
a suitable framework for modeling such tactical strategies and bringing adversarial learning research closer to
practical attacks.
Deeper behavior modeling by adversary and learner. Most existing techniques for adversarial learning
are based on a sequential game where the adversary has information about the classifier used by the learner,
although it does not have information about the parameters of the classifier. An interesting and practical
direction worthy of investigation is a game theory-based, adversarial learning model where the adversary has
only partial, possibly inaccurate information about the learners classifier. This setting would be relevant in
most real-life settings, as the classifier used by the learner is usually proprietary information that is confidential
to the learner. Similarly, moving beyond Nash equlibrium, solutions like the price of anarchy, and regret
minimization [49] could provide faster means of calculating strategies by the learner and adversary. Related
to this direction, game theory models could be made more informed by incorporating modeling and reasoning
costs such as cost to solve for Nash equilibrium, cost to maintain game play history and build opponent models
from the history. Similarly, expenses incurred by the adversary to get access to resources like legitimate email
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data sets and to the learner’s classifier could be modeled as a reward it gets, that is proportional to its success
in compromising the learner.
Robust classification with sparse data. Supervised learning algorithms, including support vector ma-
chines, regression learning, etc., that are used to build the learners classifier in adversarial learning rely heavily
on large, information rich, training sets to predict correctly. In many instances, these algorithms suffer from low
accuracy if the data used in training is sparse or does not contain all possible feature instances. To mitigate this
problem, a technique called domain adaptation or transfer learning has been proposed in literature. However,
to the best of our knowledge, transfer learning has not been investigated in the context of adversarial learning.
Using transfer learning would be very relevant in adversarial learning with sparse training data. For example,
the mapping determined by the classifier from input instances to class labels for helpful vs. not-helpful movie
reviews in a movie reviews data set (e.g., IMDB data set), could be re-used, after suitable transformations, for
classifying Internet clients as malicious vs. non-malicious from sparse, server log data. The critical problem
here is to find correspondences between datasets between the source and target domains, and then suitably
adapt the mapping learned in the source domain to the target domain.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a systematic classification of adversarial learning techniques using game theoretic
frameworks. While adversarial learning has been researched for over a decade, recent advances in machine
learning, especially with deep networks, could be used to enhance existing game theory techniques for deeper
learner and adversary behavior modeling, as well as, to compute more efficient and robust action selection
strategies by the learner. We have identified several open problems and challenges for future research along
these direcitons. With the recent, phenomenal growth of machine learning-based intelligent systems, we believe
that addressing these challenges will advance real-life, classifier-based learning systems like email spam classifiers,
social network sentiment analysis tools, and image and sensor data recognition systems on autonomous vehicles
towards becoming more robust and reliable for seamless human use.
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